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The Grand Illusion:
Hollywood And World War II,
1930-1945
Peter A. Soderbergh
"Why can't real life be more like the movies? A movie is a series of
climaxes ... and in the end there is the great climax, and the darkness , and
no concern for the years of dying embers and the utter monotony ahead."

Ernie Pyle, The Home Country
For the better part of the 1930's Hollywood paid only peripheral attention to the
combat aspects of The Great War, as if to say that All Quiet On the Western Front (1930)
was "the final word " on the subject. 1
This is not to suggest that the war was eliminated altogether. Its presence was very
much in evidence , running contrapuntally and often ominously through sentimental
melodramas (e .g., Tom Brown at Culver, 1932 ), musicals (Gold Digge rs of 1933 ;
Alexander's Ragtime Band, 1938 ), and gangster films (The Roaring Twenties, 1939). And
there were intermittent combat pictures about the French (The Road to Glory , 1936) ,
the British (The Lost Patrol, 1934 , and a re-make of The Dawn Patrol, 1938 ), and the
Germans (The Road Back, 1937 ). But on the whole these latter pictures were antique
pieces, vapid exercises in the romantic tradition which bore decreasing relevance to the
tensions of the 1930's. 2 In this sense, they were ahistorical. Even as purported reminders
of something we "ought not to let happen again" they tended to glorify the late war,
ignored the handwriting on the international wall, and successfully avoided any
confrontation with the question of war as a concept. 3 That they did not often portray
Americans in World War [ combat was not an oversight. Hollywood's antennae were up,
and the vibrations said: suspend hostilities in tender areas. Fighting and dying for an
Am erica which was a bitter blend of breadlines, apple-vending, rail-riding,
bonus-marching, and impending " revolution," was not something people were clamoring
to do - in a movie house or in fact.
The deepening of the Depression in 1932 was accompanied by extensive popular
disaffection , then. To quote Dewey Grantham, Jr.: "The nation had reached rock
bottom, and a mood of despair, of futility and apathy, spread like a deadly disease from
one end of the country to the other." Perhaps so, but motion picture people, although
affected, did not have to bear "the incredible marks of their experience." Attendance
figures were irregular in the 1930's, but the "star" system flourished, and the studios
remained in operation. Faced with the necessity of feeding a movie-hungry bu t basically
ill-tempered public, Hollywood launched into a cycle of films meant to distract audiences
from their woes. If there was a moratorium on films abou t World War I in general and
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American particplatlOn In particular, there was none on pre-1914 war, American or
otherwise. In addition to our own colonial and Civil wars, audiences went into combat
with the Foreign Legion (Under Two Flags, 1936; and a re-make of Beau Geste, 1939 ),
and the British in India (Lives of a Bengal Lancer, 1935, which earned an " Oscar" for two
assistant directors; Charge of the Light Brigade, 1936 , an academy award-winning
India-Crimea story; and Gunga Din, 1939 ).4 Uncomplicated, basically non-controversial,
old wars whose causes and short-range results could be said to be a matter of final record
(as World War One's were not, yet) were both safe and remunerative. In the nine years
since A II Quiet On the Western Front Hollywood had taken no steps toward a more
penetrating analysis of modern war.
1.

As Dexter Perkins and Glyndon Van Deusen pointed out, by 1938 "Events in Europe
were preparing what would in due course produce a reaction against the prevailing gospel
of the thirties." The "interpretation" of these events - Ethiopia's demise, the
Sino-Japanese conflict, Austria 's annexation by Germany, and the territorial cessions
forced upon Czechoslovakia - was relegated by Hollywood to the frigid eye of the
newsreel. In 1939, as the world moved inexorably toward war, Hollywood belatedly
shook off its catatonia and addressed itself to those developments which only the
sightless could legitimately refuse to recogni ze. Still , the pressing questions which plagued
the moviemakers was not " How shall we make our tardy observations as telling as
possible?" but rather: " How shall we capitalize upon a ' hot' theme without destroying
our foreign markets?" The studios' answer, in 1939 as it had been in 1917, was to move
gradually into the schrecklichkeit film. Gradually because , as Arthur Knight stated, they
were "conscious that any overt declaration of partiality in their pictures could lead to
economic reprisals on the part of the offended nation and outright bans in those
countries anxious to maintain their neutral status."S Gradually also because opinion at
home was divided as to the role the United States should play in the European struggle.
But gradually, nonetheless, and with increasing frequency as foreign market control
passed into alien hands, through vehicles such as Warner's Confessions of a Nazi Spy
(1939), RKO's Nurse Edith Cavell (1939), Twentieth Century-Fox's Four Sons (1940),
and M-G-M's The Mortal Storm (1940), Escape (1940), and Man Hunt (1941 ), the specter
of the bestial Hun - smoother but no less lethal - began to emerge again. Fifty such
films were released between 1939 and Pearl Harbor. Even the venerable All Quiet On the
Western Front, embellished by a commentary and "a number of stock shots and newsreel
items of pre-war and post-war Germany" was re-released in November 1939 as a "strongly
anti-Nazi" (but pro-German people ) contribution to the trend. Apparently the message
conveyed by the original 1930 version was too subtle to be grasped by the moviegoing
public without some assistance from Hollywood. Once more, then, the motion picture
was being employed as a "medium for stirring emotions for or against something." John
Grierson, film analyst and sire of the documentary , was visiting in Hollywood when war
broke out on September 1, 1939, and noted some anxiety and confusion among the
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"magnates" - except on one issue. "Everyone in this particular modernist group was for
going in to propaganda of some kind," Grierson recalled, "but everyone I noticed was for
avoiding ha tred.,,6
Accompanying the "propaganda" mms, a sign that portrayals of direct American
participation in total war migh t be de rigeur once again came with the release in January
1940 of "a valiant, spirited mm of patriotic fervor to stir the eye of the beholder,"
Warner's The Fighting 69th, the first of its kind since the 1920's. Unashamedly
sentimental and painfully contrived, this World War I film picked up the gauntlet cast
down by its romantic predecessors and carried it (Father Duffy, Joyce Kilmer, "wild
Bill" Donovan and all) to an apostolic penultimate. The critical reception was generally
impolite but "The public ... confounded the press by establishing the fum as one of the
big money-makers of the year," Jerry Wald and Richard Macaulay noted as they reviewed
the "best" pictures of 1939-1940. The colorless bu t influential National Board of Review
Magazine thought the film struck a powerful blow for "true patriotism" and was suitable
for "schools, libraries, church use." More significantly, and less verbosely , the Hollywood
edition of Variety for January 4,1940 cited The Fighting 69th's "timeliness."
One year later Warner Brothers struck again with Sergeant York (1941 ), based on the
exploits of Congressional Medal of Honor winner Alvin C. York. In less inflammatory
times Sergeant York might well have been one of the few genuinely thoughtful
commentaries on the meaning of mass war. One-half of the mm was devoted to a tasteful
description of York's backwoods environment and his discovery of religion. The latter
portion, although routine is its depiction of combat, clearly and simply sustained York's
rejection of killing as a solution to man's problems. That York's "convictions" remained
the central theme of the picture and resisted seduction by the Hollywood "touch" was
due largely to Gary Cooper's portrayal of the famous soldier. Accidentally, certainly,
since Cooper was, above all, a boxoffice attraction ranked seventh in the top ten , Warner
Brothers cast a man in the role of York whose ingratiating inability to express in tense
emotion protected the contents of the mm from hyperglamorization. Done in the early
or mid-1930's, Sergeant York migh t well have been the touchstone from which those who
chose to make war mms could have derived strong instruction. But in 1941, caught in the
van between Nazi victories and Japanese threats, the potentialities of the film were lost in
a miasma of war fever. Instead, it became a "timely" study in how a reluctant dragon
must sometimes subvert its spiritual composure and neutral preferences to a righteous (if
bloody) cause. In March 1942 Sergeant York was awarded two "Oscars," one for Cooper
- presented by a man in uniform, James Stewart - and one for mm editing. Just two
years earlier, in March 1940, movie czar will Hays had reported confidently to producers
and distributors that " ... those who write the history of our times are not likely to
ignore the contribution of the fllm in exposing the tragedy of war to the youth of our
country." "The romance of war," he said, "has been punctured.,,7

II.
The observation William de Mille made on a Hollywood of another time and another
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war rang remarkably true in 1942. "Hollywood in 1917," he wrote, "was far too wrought
up emotionally to indulge in any fligh ts of philosophical thought.,,8 Seldom composed
except in business matters, the movie colony clutched the high drama of Pearl Harbor to
its bosom and embarked on a four-year war fUm spree which dwarfed 1917-1918 in both
scope and intensity. Viewing Hollywood as a voluntarily independent subculture with its
own peculiar mores, some commentary on its behavioral response to the war may help to
fashion a context in which future discussions of war fUms might be more meaningful.
Allowing for individual exceptions, it would not be unfair to say that Hollywood's initial
anger and surprise - the sincerity of which paralleled the national reaction - soon gave
way to monetary aggrandizement, cynicism, defensiveness, and egocentricism.
Financially, the two years before Pearl Harbor had been distressing. Attendance had
dropped off from 85 million per week in 1937 to 55 million, and the net profits of the
seven major companies in 1940 slumped to the lowest net since 1935, 19.3 million
dollars. 9 That by 1946 the profits had escalated to 119.4 million lends support to Ezra
Goodman's assertion that the arrival of the war in 1941 was a welcome boon to
Hollywood's dwindling fortunes . As Griffith and Mayer put it: "War, like crime, may not
pay, but it helps the boxoffice." As soon as Hollywood discovered that any picture would
make money , considerations of quality and content - such as they were - were cast aside
for the duration along with refrigerators, vulcanized tires, and night baseball games.
In the realm of contributions to the "war effort," a common quest in 1942,
Hollywood was neither indecisive nor reticent. Quickly and loudly, the industry
proclaimed that its goals were two: war-aims instruction and morale building. These
intertwined purposes were summed up rather representatively (and unilaterally) by
director Ernst Lubitsch in May 1942. "In the present crisis the leaders of the motion
picture industry have to take into consideration not only what the public wants to see,"
Lu bitsch said, "bu t also what an audience should see . ... " " Our only aim can be winning the war," he continued, "and our motion picture policy must be dictated
accordingly."10 Lubitsch's pronouncement should sound familiar, for it paraphrases the
mission prescribed by the U.S. government for the Creel Committee on Public
Information in 1917. Hollywood, as if according to a musty, prepared script, was
pre-empting those Federal prerogatives it was certain would be exercized. Less naive than
in 1917 and possessed of keen retentive powers in matters of old wounds, the fUm
industry was bent on resisting governmental controls in the only way it knew how: a
publicity campaign.
Much was made of those male "stars" who rushed to enlist and the sacrifices (valuable
careers, yach ts, sweethearts, etc. ) their heroic decisions en tailed. In her piece for the
March 1942 Photoplay-Movie Mirror, "Hollywood Meets the War Challenge," Louella
Parsons spoke glowingly of the Hollywood figure who had given up his female
"conquests" and gone to war, regretting only that "he bought so many vegetables from
Japanese gardeners. ,,11 Actress Carole Lombard's death in an airline crash - as she was in
transit to Hollywood from a war bond tour - was widely and rhapsodically described by
the fan magazines as the industry's first "war casualty." Capitol Hill criticism of
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Hollywood's possible categorization as a war industry brought petulant cries of "foul"
from the movie colony and suggestions that they were being harrassed because they had
been "so faithful and devoted" to the Roosevelt administration during the 1930's.
Duncan Underhill, in the March 1942 issue of Hollywood, though t the critics should
recall that "the movie industry is the only one that gives free of charge anything to the
government." In an article for a fan magazine, "Keep 'Em Rolling Hollywood," Walter
Winchell defended the fUm colony at some length and ordered skeptics to remember that
" ... Hollywood values an Academy Award but it thinks even more of the Congressional
Medal of Honor!" Film News was less subtle about the industry's motivations. In
February 1942 it made the terse announcement that "Hollywood, through voluntary
organization in the War Activities Committee, has escaped government regulation. ,,12
The establishment of the Office of War Information by executive order (9182) on
June 13, 1942 was a futile move, then, insofar as its effect on the motion picture industry
was concerned. Neither O.W.I. head, former CBS news analyst Elmer Davis, nor the chief
of his Motion Picture Bureau, Lowell Mellett, enjoyed any more success than George
Creel a quarter-century before. Davis' first policy, "keeping the American public fully
informed on vital aspects of the war," and Mellett's 1942 speeches on the sustaining of
"national morale" were merely echoes of a platform Hollywood had already espoused
publicly and vowed it could fulfUl "unaided." The government had lost the second round
of this main event with Hollywood. In 1942-1943 the Motion Picture Bureau had a staff
of 142 and an allotment of 1.3 million dollars for operations. In 1943, not unresponsive
to lobbyists, Congress cut the Bureau budget to $50,000 and, for all practical purposes,
rendered it as impotent as Creel's Division of Films had been in 1919. The threat of
censorship thus removed, the fUm industry was free to operate as it saw fit.1 3
But if it feared being governed, Hollywood behaved like government in one respect: it
kept exhaustive records. Contributions to the "war effort" between 1942 and 1946 were
well publicized both within and without the industry. In an extended exercise of
image-polishing, through the various media and in house organs such as The Public
Information Committee of the Motion Picture Industry's Motion Picture Letter and the
War Activities Committee's annual Movies A t War, statistics flowed which "proved"
Hollywood's personal commitment to The Cause. 14 It was noted, for example, that
"stars" had traveled 5 million miles to "keep the boys happy"; theatre audiences had
contributed "$35,582,826.33" to charity drives; 630,000 soldiers overseas saw
Hollywood releases at 1,269 separate shows every night of 1944; and that in the same
year, 240 million men saw movies at the 1,218 domestic theatres run by the Army
Motion Picture Service. Even in tabulating its "contribution" to the greatest war in
history, the measuring devices used were numerical. In October 1945 the Motion Picture
Letter estimated the fUm industry's total "gift" to the U.S. government at 45 million
dollars for: 204 weeks of service, 1042 different features, and 1051 short subjects.

III.
Once war was declared, whatever reservations the fUm industry may have felt
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previously about how (not if) war should be portrayed were hurriedly dropped.
The outcome was a steady series of battle epics which, among other things, caricatured
the Nazis, Japanese, and Italians more garishly than the filmmakers of 1917-1918 would
have thought possible. As William K. Everson observed, " ... understanding of and respect
for the 'enemy' became a thing of the past." "If the bad guys of world War One had
seemed stereotypes," he continued, "they had nothing on the scoundrels who represented
the Axis powers!" Hollywood, in fact, had blended the shrecklichkeit approach with the
romantic formula exemplified by The Big Parade school into a war film package until
then unknown. Here and there, as in a National Board of Review Magazine editorial in
January 1942, "Movies and the War," voices of moderation were raised urging that the
film industry not employ movies as the "enemy" (meaning the Nazis, primarily) had done
a few years earlier. Critic James Agee , although inconsistent in his position on war films ,
expressed concern in 1944 that, conditioned by the "semi-information" of such films , we
might "do things to defeated enemies" which might injure the victors spiritually.lS But
such warnings, valid or not, were swallowed up in the rush to dramatize the conflict on
film. "The war thundered savagely and impersonally in the ears of the people," Paul
Michael recalled, "and Hollywood was quick to respond to the temper of the times with a
series of films - dramas on a grand scale, showing heroism, bombings, flaming cities, and
invading arrnies.,,16
In the period 1942-1946, of the 1400-odd films released by Hollywood studios, an
average of 25 per cent were combat pictures. Few phases of the war were ignored. In
many more films than need be listed Hollywood re-created combat actions involving the
U.S. Army (e.g., Sahara, 1943); the Air Force (A Guy Named Joe, 1943); the Navy
(Destroyer, 1943); the Marines (Wake Island, 1942) ; the Merchant Marine (Action in the
North Atlantic, 1943); the medical (So Proudly We Hail , 1943 and The Story of Dr.
Wassell, 1944); the British (in the air in Eagle Squadron, 1942 and on land in The
Immortal Sergeant, 1943); the Russians (Counter-Attack, 1945) ; and the Norwegians
(The Edge of Darkness , 1943). But for an obvious improvement in technical virtuosity on
the part of moviemakers - and a bigger war to portray - the character delineations,
storylines, and dialogue of these films departed little from the pattern set by The Big
Parade in 1925. Hollywood's handling of the new military techniques, Bosley Crowther
noticed, was "usually altered to suit the convenience of the plot.,,17 In 1945 Dorothy
Jones, reviewing these types of pictures, pointed out that "films about our fighting units
were played strictly as melodrama - blood-and-thunder stuff usually without one glimpse
of understanding about the meaning of the war itself. ,,18 Such was the civilian fare.
It is interesting to note , however, that beyond the seas the formula war film was less
palatable. When Warner Brothers' Objective Burma (1945) was shown in London, the
critical response can only be described as "outraged." As the leading man in the
paratroop-oriented saga, Errol Flynn, commented, the film "might have been good for
American morale at the time, but it sure made the English mad to see the U.S. win the
war single-handed. "19 Noteworthy, too, was the agreement between belligerents that no
"newsreel and war films" would be distributed for viewing by Allied prisoners in
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European camps. And in 1945 one American sailor spoke for our troops overseas in
general when he stated: "As for fictional war pictures, they don't want them at sea.
Documentaries of actual battle, yes, but not imaginary heroics of Army, Navy, Coast
Guard, Marines, and Air Force. Those are for civilians."
As the war drew to a close in 1945 signs of a shift in Hollywood's faith in the war film
as a staple became evident, reflecting not only the increasing national interest in another
return to "normalcy" but also the industry's suspicion that " normalcy" would be
accompanied by another change in taste. "Perceiving as the war ended that uniforms were
'box-office poison'," Oliver Jensen wrote in 1946, " the movies beat all other industries to
reconversion. ,,20 There was a kind of searching for "new popular subjects" a la 1918 and
some reflecting on the behavior of the industry during the war which bordered on a veiled
act of contrition. In 1945 Spyros Skouras, then president of Twentieth Century-Fox,
thought the movies had "come of age" during the war and would begin to make realistic,
contributory films (in addition to films-for-profit). 21 Arthur Rosenheimer, Jr., then a
staff member of the Museum of Modern Art, wondered in 1946 why, "since the issues in
this war were so clear-cut," Hollywood expended so much energy on beating a proverbial
dead horse and so little on "demonstrating democracy in action." Better pictures were
called for and promised by Nathan Golden of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce , Barney Balaban of Paramount Pictures, and O.W.l. 's Robert Riskin. President
of the Motion Picture Association Eric Johnston challenged the industry in March 1946
to " utilize films of various kinds . . . for various audiences," and the fast-fading "rajah" of
M-G-M, Louis Mayer, expressed the belief that films "should not only afford
entertainment but be of educational value."2 2 Amidst this sudden flush of self-analysis
the war film was quietly re-interred, intact, ready for exhumation when the public mood
seemed receptive. In October 1945, writing for the first issue of the Hollywood
Quarterly, Dudley Nichols spoke an epitaph for the war film's temporary headstone. "A
hundred and twenty million people in America," Nichols said, "know whatever they
know of the reality of war only through films.,,23
Twenty-three years and several wars later, two hundred million Americans know of the
reality of war only through films. The wars have become ideological and agonizingly
complex. The films teach us only to relive the halcyon years of World War II, when
Hollywood thought it understood the simple nature of our crusade. 24
University of Pittsburgh
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